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Several past studies have found health risk to be negatively correlated with the probability of voluntary
health insurance. This is contrary to what one would expect from standard textbook models of adverse
selection and moral hazard. The two most common explanations to the counter-intuitive result are
either (1) that risk-aversion is correlated with health — i.e. that healthier individuals are also more
risk-averse — or (2) that insurers are able to discriminate among customers based on observable health-risk
characteristics. We revisited these arguments, using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe (SHARE). Self-assessed health served as an indicator of risk: better health, lower risk. We
did, indeed, observe a negative correlation between risk and insurance but found no evidence of heterogeneous
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All health-care policy reforms involving voluntary health insurance need to 
address the problem of asymmetric information. As a cause of adverse selection 
and moral hazard, asymmetric information between the buyer and the seller poses 
a serious problem for the functioning of the voluntary health insurance market. In 
both research and practice, this problem has chiefly been considered in the 
context of the United States market for health insurance. Nonetheless, voluntary 
health insurance exists in all European countries—despite the predominance of 
social insurance or tax-financed systems. European voluntary health insurance 
serves many different functions; allowing faster treatment, a broader choice of 
hospitals, and better amenities. The voluntary contracts generally constitute 




Policy-makers may view voluntary health insurance as a vehicle for easing the 
public burden of health-care financing. Several countries have seen attempts to 
introduce more private elements in the financing of health care, but their share has 
remained fairly small (OECD, 2004). However, the long-term sustainability of 
publicly financed health care will soon be challenged by demographic changes—
more dramatic in some countries than in others (Klevmarken and Lindgren, 
2008). As a result of these changes, the market for voluntary health insurance 
might drastically aggrandize—not only in Europe but in all OECD countries 
(OECD, 2004). From a public policy perspective, it is therefore crucial to possess 
firm knowledge about individual characteristics that are correlates to holdings of 
voluntary health insurance. Do high-risk individuals self-select into voluntary 
health insurance or are insurers able to discriminate among customers and offer 





premiums in order to cover in
We addressed this question with an empirical investigation of the determinants of 
voluntary health insurance holdings in ten European countries, using data from 
the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE).  The SHARE 
database offers rich information on health and health-related behavior of the 50+ 
population of a number of European countries.
2 In particular, we analyzed the 
correlation between health-related risk and holdings of voluntary health insurance. 
If the European markets for voluntary health insurance were characterized by 
asymmetric information, we would expect people with higher ex ante health-risk 
levels to be more inclined to purchase voluntary health insurance than their low-
risk counterparts. By adopting the not too far-fetched assumption that future 
health (and thereby also future healthcare needs) is partly determined by a 
stochastic process with a variance depending negatively on current health, we can 
view the risk insured by voluntary health insurance as depending negatively on 
health.  
 
A well-known result from the theoretical insurance literature states that when 
asymmetric information prevails, it will not be profitable for an insurer to offer all 
individuals a contract based on the average risk of the population as a whole (see, 
for example, Rotschild and Stiglitz, 1976). Because of the lower expected benefit 
of buying insurance for individuals with relatively low risk, they are more likely 
to remain uninsured than individuals with relatively high risks. The insurance 
pool will eventually consist of an adverse selection of the population with a 
higher-than-average risk level. As a consequence, the insurer will have to increase 












individuals out of the insurance pool. Consequently, standard textbook models of 
adverse selection and moral hazard predict that the (ex-post) average risk-level 
among those holding voluntary insurance to be higher than the average population 
risk. We would, therefore, expect a  positive correlation between health-risk and 
voluntary health insurance and—since health-risk was assumed to be negatively 
dependent on health—a  negative correlation between self-assessed health and 
insurance. 
 
Even though some past empirical studies have, indeed, found support for the 
theoretical prediction of a positive correlation between risk and insurance—for 
example, with data from the British annuity market (Finkelstein and Poterba, 
2004), and the U.S. market for supplemental medical insurance for the elderly 
(Ettner, 1997)—empirical studies of the demand for voluntary health insurance 
generally fail to find support for such a relationship (see, for example, Cawley 
and Philipson, 1999; Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Finkelstein and McGarry, 
2003; and Doiron et al., 2008). Insured tend to be healthier, younger, more 
educated, and richer than the uninsured (Doiron et al., 2008). Low-risk 
individuals simply seem to be more willing to purchase coverage in addition to 
the level offered by the mandatory scheme.  
 
The empirical literature has furnished two distinct sets of explanations to this 
finding. First, individual risk may be correlated with risk preference (Finkelstein 
and McGarry, 2003; Doiron et al., 2008). This would mean that individuals with 
better health are more risk-averse than individuals with relatively bad health. The 
rationale for this assumption is that, the more risk-averse an individual becomes, 
the more inclined he or she will be to undertake precautionary measures with 
regards to health; to invest more in health. These health-investments may take the 
form of exercise or absence of smoking or alcohol (i.e. lack of disinvestments). 
Greater investments in health lead to both better self-assessed health and fewer 
observable medical conditions. Since risk-averse individuals are also more likely 
to obtain voluntary health insurance, the observed negative correlation between   4
risk and insurance might possibly be an effect of those individuals’ risk 
preferences. If this is the case, we would expect observable health conditions—
such as diagnosed diseases—to decrease self-assessed health but to increase the 
probability of insurance. A competing explanation to the findings that individual 
risk seems to be negatively correlated with insurance is that insurers are able to 
offer more attractive contracts to low-risk individuals, by discriminating on the 
basis of observable characteristics (Shmueli, 2001). If so, we would expect 
observable health conditions to decrease both self-assessed health and the 
probability of insurance. 
 
Our study was essentially carried out in a two-step process. In the first step, we 
estimated a series of probit-models to see whether we could find the negative 
correlation between health-risk and probability of insurance. Self-assessed health 
served as an indicator of risk: better health, lower risk. In order to limit the effects 
of framing and at what point in the SHARE survey questionnaire the question 
about self-assessed health was asked, two different versions of self-assessed-
health questions were used. We started with a simple specification of the 
estimation model, comprising only health-risk as an explanatory variable.  In 
similarity to previous studies, we—indeed—found a negative correlation, 
irrespective of version. We then estimated a series of specifications, in which 
subsequent specification comprised a larger set of explanatory variables (country, 
demographics, health and risk-related behavior), chosen on the basis of previous 
empirical research (Ettner, 1997; Hurd and McGarry, 1997; Smith and Kington, 
1997; Perry and Rosen, 2004; Doiron et al., 2008). The negative correlation 
persisted.  
 
In the second step, we tried to answer the question whether the negative 
correlation was a result of heterogeneous risk preferences among insured 
individuals or screening on behalf of the insurer. To do so, we omitted the self-
assessed health variables from the probit-model and estimated a model with only 
countries, demographics, and observable health characteristics as explanatory   5
self-assessed health, ch
variables. Subsequently, we estimated an ordered probit model with the same 
explanatory variables, but with self-assessed health as dependent variable. This 
process was carried out on both versions of the questions. By comparing the effect 
of observable health characteristics on self-assessed health to those on the 
probability of insurance, we concluded that observable conditions (e.g. diagnosed 
chronic conditions) generally seemed to reduce both self-assessed health and the 
probability of insurance. Hence, we did not find support for the heterogeneous 




2. Data: sources and description 
 
All data were obtained from the SHARE—a multidisciplinary and cross-national 
micro database. The SHARE follows the design of the US Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS), and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA).
3 The 
database currently contains information from 12 countries, comprising a total of 
approximately 32,000 individuals above 50 years of age and their household 
members. We used data from 10 of the countries covered by the first wave of 
SHARE, conducted in 2004: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
4 Data from the Netherlands were 
excluded, because the structure of its health insurance system differs from the 
other countries to such an extent that it does not allow for a viable comparison.
5 
 
Our dataset included information on a number of health-related variables (e.g. 








conditions (such as present job characteristics and opportunities to work past 
retirement age), education, sources of current income, wealth, consumption, etc. 
The overall response rates varied substantially between countries, ranging from 
38 percent in Switzerland to 69 percent in France, with an average for all 
participating countries of 62 percent.  
 
Data on self-assessed health and holdings of voluntary health insurance were 
central to our study. However, some individuals did not answer the SHARE 
questionnaire questions about these two variables. Thus, after omitting 
observations with missing values, we were left with 25,390 observations. They  
were unevenly spread among the countries, ranging from 1000 (Switzerland) to 
3817 (Belgium).  
 
2.1. Dependent variable  
 
The dependent variable measured whether the respondent held any kind of 
voluntary health insurance. It took the value 1, if the respondent had any 
voluntary health insurance, and 0 otherwise. In the English language version of 
the SHARE questionnaire, the question was formulated: ”Do you have any 
voluntary, supplementary or private health insurance for at least one of the 
following types of care in order to complement for the care offered by the national 
health service?” (and the corresponding wording for the other languages). The 
respondent was then free to answer either yes or no to a number of different 
voluntary health-insurance contracts. The insurance would be either for full 
hospital costs, drugs expenses, direct access to specialists, extended choice of 
doctors, or for dental care. Table 1 shows the frequency of voluntary health-
insurance coverage by country. Voluntary coverage varied from 78.7 percent in 
France to a mere 2.2 percent in Sweden. A total of 6693 (approximately 26.4 
percent) individuals in the full dataset had some form of voluntary health 
insurance.  
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the question was asked: ”Wou
[Table 1 about here] 
 
2.2. Independent variables 
 
Table 2 provides a list of all independent variables and descriptive statistics. In 
the first step of the study, we were interested in the effect of health risk on the 
likelihood of holding voluntary health insurance. In order to infer this effect, we 
also had to account for other possible determinants. In addition to self-assessed 
health as an indicator of health-risk, there were three groups of control variables, 
reflecting demographics, health and health-related behavior, and country.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Health-risk (self-assessed health) 
The key independent variable was health-risk, for which self-assessed health  was 
used as a proxy.
6 Two different sets of self-assessed health variables were 
available and used in parallel estimations.
7 Thus, all SHARE respondents were 
asked to report how their health corresponded to two separate sets of given 
alternatives. This was done both in the beginning and at the end of the physical-
health module. Following the notation of the SHARE questionnaire, we refer to 
the two different sets as the “European” and as the “American” version. The order 
of the two sets of questions was randomized among respondents. In both versions, 






7 T h i s  w a s  d o n e  i n  o r d e r  t o  a n a l y z e  t h e  r o b u s t n e s s  o f  r e s u l t s .  T h e r e  m a y  b e  p r o b l e m s  
regarding how to interpret responses to the self‐assessed questions, of course. Interviews 
were, for instance, performed in several languages, and there may be systematic variance between 
countries concerning the way health-related questions were perceived. Moreover, cultural 
differences among countries may lead to differences in people’s propensity to report, for instance, 
low levels or high levels of health. In addition, previous studies have shown that some individuals 
tend to change their responses among multiple questions about self-assessed health, depending on 
how and when in the questionnaire the questions are asked. (Crossley and Kennedy, 2002).   8
of the European version were: ”very good”, ”good”, “fair”, ”bad” or ”very bad”; 
while the American-version alternatives were: ”excellent”, ”very good”, “good 
health”, ”fair”, and ”poor”.  
 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 presents statistics on voluntary health-insurance coverage by health 
status, using both the European and the American scale. The medium level of 
self-assessed health served as reference group both in the “European” version 
(”fair health”) and in the “American” one (”good health”). 
 
Observable health conditions and behavioral risk factors 
The health and behavioral risk-related variables included specific dummies for a 
number of conditions: cancer, heart problems, diabetes, asthma, high blood 
pressure, and chronic lung diseases. We also included a variable for the 
respondent’s total number of chronic symptoms. In the English version of the 
questionnaire, the question about chronic conditions was formulated: ”Has a 
doctor ever told you that you had any of the conditions on this card?” The 
respondent could then answer yes to any of the symptoms.  
 
This group of variables also included a set of dummies for risk-related behavior; 
smoking, alcohol consumption (more than five times per week), and exercise 
(simply whether the respondent performed any form of physical activity at least 
once per week). The corresponding control groups were the people who did not 
smoke, did not consume alcohol, and did not exercise. Finally, we also included a 
dummy-variable for depression. This variable was based on a subjective measure; 
it assumes the value of one, if the respondent answered yes to the question 
whether he or she had been feeling depressed during the last month.  
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robustness checks on our resu
Demographics and country 
The demographic control variables included age, education, gender, marital 
status, employment status, and whether or not the respondent was born in the 
country of residence. Furthermore, a series of dummy variables was used for 
different wealth brackets. Wealth was defined as purchasing power parity-
adjusted household net wealth, and the dummy variables represented intervals 
between 10th, 25th, 50th 75th and the 90th percentiles. The lowest wealth group 
(i.e. the first decile) served as reference. We used imputed values constructed by 
the SHARE team for observations with missing wealth values.
8  
 
Our measure of education consisted of two dummy variables; one indicating 
secondary education and the other higher-than-secondary education. Individuals 
with less-than-secondary education served as the reference group.  
 
Two dummy variables indicated unemployment and self-employment. We 
expected unemployment to reduce the probability of insurance. Given that a 
person who runs his own business may risk suffering losses if he or she gets sick, 
we expected self-employment to have a positive effect.  
 
Country-specific dummy variables were intended to capture effects of differences 
in health-care or health-care-financing systems as well as in other unobservable 
factors, such as culture and institutions. As a result of the relatively large number 
of observations from Germany, we let the country serve as the reference group.  
 
Health care systems in Europe are certainly rather different. Thus, in order to 
further control for the effect of institutional difference and to perform some 






Greece, 6.5%. on the country dummy variables. Each control variable in the “Health and Risk” 
and “Demographics” groups of Table 2 was multiplied by each country dummy, 
hence, creating the corresponding interaction variables for each country. In total, 
we used approximately 250 control variables in the robustness check process. 
 
3. Model specification and statistical method 
 
The first step in our analysis consisted of investigating the correlation between 
health risk and insurance. Thus, following the method of Ettner (1997) and 
Doiron et al. (2008), we first estimated a specification that contained our health-
risk measures only (self-assessed-health dummies). Then we obtained the 
subsequent specifications by adding group for group of explanatory variables to 
the baseline specification. Since the dependent variable was dichotomous, we 
used a probit-model to estimate each consecutive specification. The objective was 
to see whether the relationship between risk and insurance disappeared, when 
more explanatory variables were added. 
 
Model (1) below represents the simplest specification. Throughout,   is the 
probability that individual i holds any VHI, and 
i p
i ε  is an error term.   is a vector 
of self-assessed health dummies (which may be of either the European or the 
American formulation). In Model (2), we added the country-specific dummy 
variables, contained in the vector  . In the two subsequent models, a vector  , 
representing health and behavioral risk- factors was added. Model 5 is the full 





(1)      i i i H p ε β + = ˆ
1
 
(2)     i i i i C H p ε β β + + = ˆ ˆ
2 1
 
  10(3)     i i i i i D C H p ε β β β + + + = ˆ ˆ ˆ
3 2 1
 
(4)     i i i i i R C H p ε β β β + + + = ˆ ˆ ˆ
4 2 1
 
(5)     i i i i i i R D C H p ε β β β β + + + + = ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
4 3 2 1
 
As a second step, we compared the effect of observable health conditions on the 
probability of insurance to the effect of the same variables on self-assessed health. 
Thus, following a method similar the one of Lokshin and Ravallion (2005), we 
first estimated an ordered probit-model with self-assessed health as dependent 
variable. Model 6 below represents this specification, where   is a discrete 
variable that can assume four different values, each representing one of the health 
levels. Thereafter, we estimated a probit-model with the same independent 
variables but with insurance as dependent variable (Model 7). 
i h
 
(6)     i i i i i R D C h η γ γ γ + + + = ˆ ˆ ˆ
3 2 1
 








4.1. Voluntary health insurance and health-risk  
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Tables 4 and 5 show the main results in terms of estimated marginal effects from 
the probit-regressions, utilizing the European and the American versions of the   12
self-assessed-health scale, respectively. Each coefficient denotes the effect on the 
estimated likelihood that the respondent held voluntary health insurance of 
moving from the baseline risk level, represented by “fair health” in the European 
and “good health” in the American version, to the corresponding risk-levels. In 
both cases, increased health-risk means a lower likelihood of holding voluntary 
health insurance. Our result supports previous findings of a negative correlation 
between health-risk and voluntary health insurance. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
In the simplest specification (Model 1), only the variables for self-assessed health 
(as indicators of risk: better health, lower risk) were included. The coefficients for 
all variables except “excellent health” in the American version were significant at 
the 1% or 10%-level. Moving from fair to very good self-assessed health in the 
European version increased the probability of voluntary health insurance with 
approximately 0.17. Note, however, that the effect was not monotonic. Moving 
from good to very good health actually decreased the probability of voluntary 
health insurance.  
 
 
In Model 2, we added the set of country specific dummy-variables, controlling for 
institutional differences between the European countries. All coefficients for self-
assessed health had the expected signs and were significant at the 1% level. The 
effects were monotonic. In the European version, moving from fair health to very 
good health increased the likelihood of voluntary health insurance with 0.242. 
Similarly, moving to the lowest level of self-assessed health (very bad health) 
decreased the likelihood with 0.249. The corresponding numbers for the 
American version were 0.158 and 0.288. 
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In Models 3, 4 and 5, we continued to add groups of control variables. In Model 
3, we controlled for demographic effects, while model 4 included observable 
health factors and risk behavior. Model 5 was the full model with all control 
variables present. It is evident from tables 4 and 5 that the negative correlation 
between risk and insurance certainly persisted. The marginal effects on the 
probability of voluntary health insurance of moving from fair/good to the best 
category of self-assessed health were, however, reduced to 0.095 and 0.081. Note, 
though, that the effect of moving from good health to very good health in the 
American version was not statistically significant. 
 
 
4.2. Robustness checks 
 
In order to test the robustness of our results, we estimated models 3, 4, and 5 with 
an additional set of control variables, namely the country specific interaction 
variables. The rationale was to examine whether the found relationship would 
vanish once we took into account the additional effect of, for example, being 
unemployed in a specific country. The results from these probit regressions are 
shown in table 6 for the European version and table 7 for the American version. 
Indeed, the positive correlation between self-assessed health and voluntary health 
insurance holdings, or for that matter, the negative correlation between risk and 
insurance, seemed to persist. As apparent from tables 6 and 7, the marginal effects 
were generally reduced slightly, and the p-values were increased for some of the 
self-reported health levels. Nonetheless, including the interaction variables did not 
substantially alter the results. 
 
Moreover, we estimated a series of models in which one or more country was 
omitted. The reason for this was to examine whether results might be driven by a 
particularly strong effect in a specific country. When doing this, the marginal 
effects of moving from one self-assessed health level to another were reduced 
slightly in some cases, but the overall relationship was intact. Finally, we note that   14
there were no particular differences with regards to which country that was 
omitted. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
 
4.3. Risk preference or screening? 
 
If the positive correlation between self-assessed health and insurance was caused 
by heterogeneous risk preferences—i.e. that healthy individuals also were more 
risk-averse—then we would expect observable health conditions to increase the 
probability of insurance but to decrease self-assessed health. The first two 
columns of Table 8 show the results from the probit-regressions of Model 7 on the 
European and the American SHARE versions of self-assessed health. The third 
column shows the results from the ordered probit regression of Model 6, using 
insurance as a dependent variable.  
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
Among the observable health conditions, cancer heart problems, chronic lung 
disease, and the number of chronic conditions all had statistically significant 
negative effects on self-assessed health in the European version. In the American 
version, diabetes also had a statistically significant negative effect (at the 10%-
level). The only observable health condition that actually turned out to have a 
positive effect on self-assessed health was high blood pressure.  
 
Cancer had a statistically significant positive effect on the probability of holding 
insurance (p-value 0.063), while heart problems, diabetes, and chronic lung 
disease decreased the probability. Smoking and drinking appeared to increase the   15
probability of holding insurance.  
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we addressed the demand for voluntary health insurance in Europe. 
In similarity to other studies (Ettner, 1997; Hurd and McGarry, 1997; Smith and 
Kington, 1997; Perry and Rosen, 2004; Doiron et al., 2008), we found that 
individuals with a lower risk (measured as better self-assessed health) were more 
likely to have voluntary health insurance than relatively risky individuals. This is 
not consistent with what we would expect from the theory of adverse selection. A 
strand of research argues that such results are caused by unobservable factors, 
such as personality and risk preference, and that these factors are negatively 
correlated with self-assessed health. In contrast to some previous studies 
(Finkelstein and McGarry, 2003; Doiron et al., 2008), we did not find clear 
evidence of such a relationship.  
 
The effects of observable health conditions on the probability of holding 
insurance and on self-assessed health are crucial for sorting out whether the 
correlation between health-risk and holding insurance was a result of risk 
preference among insured individuals or screening on behalf of the insurer. Ettner 
(1997), for instance, found mixed results with regards to individual conditions. 
Doiron et al. (2008) suggested that individuals with more long-term conditions 
were more likely to purchase insurance. In our study, high blood pressure actually 
turned out to have a positive effect on self-assessed health; the variable might 
capture some unobservable personal trait that tends to be correlated with high 
blood pressure, though. Since the coefficients of all other included health 
conditions had the expected signs, we believe that we could safely conclude that 
observable health conditions had a negative effect on self-assessed health.   
 
Current smoking has certainly been found to be associated with a lower rate of   16
health insurance (Ettner, 1997; Doiron et al., 2008), but individuals who have 
been smoking in the past may not be either more or less prone to have 
supplemental health insurance (Hurd and McGarry, 1997). In our study, smoking 
(and drinking) appeared to increase the probability of holding insurance. Most 
observable health conditions seemed to decrease the probability, though. Thus, we 
did not find any evidence that unambiguously supports the hypothesis that 
heterogeneous risk preferences are behind the observed negative correlation 
between risk and insurance. 
 
Obviously, there may be some other factor influencing both health and the 
propensity to hold health insurance. The quest for such a factor, as well as the 
analysis of the effect of the explanatory variables on the demand for health 
insurance can be performed within an extended demand-for-health framework. 
Firmly founded on neoclassical economic theory, the demand-for-health model 
(Grossman, 1972a, b) remains the dominating theoretical model for analyzing the 
demand for health (and health investments). Afundamental idea behind the model 
is that the demand for medical care is derived from the more fundamental demand 
for health. Likewise, in an extended demand-for-health framework, it seems 
reasonable to think about the demand for health insurance not as a demand for 
insurance  per se, but as derived from the demand for health. However, no 
extension of the demand-for-health model that incorporates the (derived) demand 
for health insurance has been published, even though this originally deterministic 
model has certainly been extended to include various types of uncertainty (see, for 
instance, Chang, 1996; Liljas, 1998). It goes beyond the purpose of this paper to 
develop a formal extension of Grossman’s model, which incorporates the demand 
for health insurance. However, it is possible to use a somewhat heuristic 
approach, applying the fundamentals of the demand-for-health model to the 
demand for health insurance without a specific model-adaption to the insurance 
problem. 
 
Thus, as regards an alternative explanation for the observed positive correlations   17
between health and health insurance, the demand-for-health framework contains a 
plausible candidate: time preferences. An individual who does not discount future 
wellbeing at all, for instance, will demand more health than another individual 
who discounts future wellbeing, ceteris paribus. Likewise, no discounting of 
future wellbeing means that the expected payoff from holding health insurance 
and, hence, the present value of health insurance, will be higher than when future 
outcomes are discounted. Consequently, time preferences may be responsible for 
the observed correlation between risk and insurance.     
 
The effects of the three central explanatory variables of the Grossman model—
age, wage, and education—on the demand for health insurance can be inferred as 
follows. First, as the individual gets older the likelihood of adverse health shocks 
becomes higher and, hence, strengthens the incentive for holding health 
insurance;  Second, a higher wage rate means that the present value of health 
insurance increases, since the potential losses of income are larger when the wage 
rate is higher; Third, more education means enhanced labor-market opportunities 
and, hence, an individual who has a university degree will put a higher value on 
health insurance than a comparable individual with less education. 
 
Education, being female, being married, and being self-employed, all increased 
the probability of holding insurance, while being foreign born decreased the 
probability. Non-significant negative coefficients were found for age and being 
unemployed. With a couple of exceptions, the results are in line with previous 
research (Ettner, 1997; Hurd and McGarry, 1997; Smith and Kington, 1997; Perry 
and Rosen, 2004; and Doiron et al., 2008). First, a common finding of previous 
research is that people who have voluntary health insurance tend to be younger 
than those who do not (Ettner, 1997; Doiron et al., 2008); we could not identify a 
significant effect of age. Second, whereas our study showed the expected positive 
sign for self-employment, Perry and Rosen (2004) found that self-employment 
reduced the probability of having health insurance in the U.S. Given the “more to 
lose” rationale, this might seem surprising, but their results should obviously be   18
seen in the light of the fact that American health insurance generally is tied to 
employment. We found no statistically significant effect of wealth, whereas a 
positive correlation between wealth (or income) and insurance was found in 
several previous studies (Ettner, 1997; Hurd and McGarry, 1997; Smith and 
Kington, 1997; Perry and Rosen, 2004; and Doiron et al., 2008).  
 
Health insurance provides the text-book example of a market with adverse 
selection. Yet, there is little or no evidence in practice that adverse selection is or 
must be an important problem in health insurance. Health-insurance markets seem 
to be stable, despite the prediction of the Rotschild-Stiglitz model either that an 
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Country  Total  VHI %  Country Total  VHI % 
Austria  1887  394 20.9  Greece 2895  118 4.1 
Belgium 3817  2419  63.4  Italy  2550  88  3.5 
Denmark  1702  407 23.9  Spain  2379  181 7.6 
France 3112  2448 78.7  Sweden  3045  67  2.2 






Variable   Mean Variable Mean (S.D.)
Very good health (EU)  1 if very good SAH in EU version 0.186 Excel. health (US) 1 if excellent SAH in US version 0.101
Good health (EU) 1  if  good SAH in EU version 0.433 Very good health  1 if very good SAH in US version 0.211
Fair health (EU)  1 if fair SAH in EU version 0.282 Good health (US) 1 if good SAH in US version 0.391
Bad health (EU)  1 if bad SAH in EU version 0.078 Fair health (US) 1 if fair health in US 0.225
Very bad health (EU)  1 if bad SAH in EU version 0.021 Poor health (US) 1 if poor health in US version 0.071
Demographics 
Variable   Mean  Variable  Mean
Age  Age in years 63.8  (10.63) Unemployed 1 if unemployed 0.033
Secondary education  1 if secondary education  0.297 Wealth 10th 1 if wealth within 10th percentile 0.154
> Secondary education  1 if higher than secondary educ. 0.187 Wealth 25th 1 if wealth within 25th percentile 0.252
Female  1 if respondent female  0.558 Wealth 50th 1 if wealth within 50th percentile 0.248
Married  1 if respondent married  0.699 Wealth 75th 1 if wealth within 75th percentile 0.148
Foreign born  1 if born outside survey country 0.085 Wealth 90th 1 if wealth within 90th percentile 0.096
Self employed  1 if self-employed 0.070  
Health and risk 
Variable   Mean  Variable  Mean 
Ever had cancer  1 if ever had cancer  0.052 Chronic lung disease 1 if respondent has chronic lung 0.048
Heart problems  1 if ever had heart problems 0.119 Smoking 1 if ever been smoking 0.457
Diabetes  1 if respondent has diabetes 0.095 Alcohol > 5/week 1 if alcohol > 5 times/week 0.243
Asthma  1 if respondent has asthma 0.046 Exercise 1 if phys. activity at least  1  0.583
High blood pressure  1 if high blood pressure 0.315 Depression 1 if felt depressed last month 0.379
Number of chronic  Number of chronic symptoms 1.52 (1.43)  
Country dummies 
Variable   Mean Variable  Mean 
Austria  1 if resp from Austria  0.074 Greece 1 if resp from Greece 0.114
Belgium  1 if resp from Belgium 0.150 Italy 1 if resp from Italy 0.100
Denmark  1 if resp from Denmark  0.067 Spain 1 if resp from Spain 0.094
France  1 if resp from France  0.123 Sweden 1 if resp from Sweden 0.120
Germany  1 if resp from Germany  0.118 Switzerland 1 if resp from Switzerland 0.039
Table 2: Definition of independent variables and descriptive statistics.  
SAH (EU)  Number  % VHI  SAH (US)  Number  % VHI 
Very good  4718  28.3  Excellent  2568  28.7 
Good 11002 29.8  Very  good  5359  26.8 
Fair 7153  22.7 Good  9943  28.1 
Bad 1984  18.4 Fair 5719  23.6 
Very bad  536  17.5  Poor  1801  22.0 





Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Very good health  0.173*** (0.009) 0.242***  (0.009) 0.094***  (0.010) 0.205***  (0.009) 0.095***  (0.010) 
Good health  0.217*** (0.007) 0.142***  (0.007) 0.060***  (0.007) 0.115***  (0.007) 0.056***  (0.007) 
Bad health  -0.153*** (0.011) -1.61***  (0.011) -0.1 (0.011)  19**  -0.145***  (0.011) -0.119***  (0.011) 
Very bad health  -0.185*** (0.019) -0.249***  (0.017) -0.1 (0.018)  94**  -0.217***  (0.018) -0.187**  (0.018) 
N  25390  25390 25390 25390 25390 
Control  variables   Countries Countries Countries Countries 
     Demographics  Demographics 
        Health & risk  Health & risk 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%-level, ** = significant at 5%-level, * = significant at 10%-level.
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Excellent health  0.017 (0.010) 0.158***  (0.011) 0.073**  (0.010) 0.144***  (0.011) 0.081**  (0.010) 
Very good health  -0.041* (0.007) 0.077***  (0.008) 0.014  (0.007) 0.065***  (0.008) 0.016  (0.008) 
Fair health  -0.141*** (0.007) -0.147*** (0.007) -0.072** (0.007) -0.120***  (0.007) -0.068** (0.007) 
Poor health  -0.225*** (0.010) -0.288*** (0.009) -0.182** (0.010) -0.248***  (0.010) -0.180*** (0.011) 
N 25390  25390  25390  25390  25390 
Control variables    Countries  Countries  Countries  Countries 
     Demographics    Demographics 
        Health & risk  Health & risk 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** = significant at 1%-level, ** = significant at 5%-level, * = significant at 10%-level.
Table 5: Probit regression results, "American" version. Coefficients represent marginal effects. Variable  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Very good health  0.095*** (0.009)  0.190*** (0.010)  0.083** (0.009) 
Good health  0.054** (0.007)  0.113*** (0.007)  0.048* (0.007) 
Bad health  -0.121** (0.011)  -0.148** (0.011)  -0.121** (0.011) 
Very bad health  -0.201** (0.017)  -0.226** (0.018)  -0.198** (0.017) 
N  25390 25390 25390 
Control variables  Countries  Countries  Countries 
 Demographics    Demographics 








  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Excellent health  0.069** (0.010)  0.126*** (0.011) 0.069* (0.010) 
Very good health  0.010 (0.007)  0.055* (0.008)  0.010 (0.007) 
Fair health  -0.056** (0.007)  -0.120*** (0.007) -0.068** (0.007) 
Poor health  -0.199** (0.010)  -0.263** (0.010)  -0.199*** (0.010) 
N 25390  25390  25390 
Control variables  Countries  Countries  Countries 
 Demographics    Demographics 













Variable  SAH (EU)  SAH (US)  Prob(ins) 
Age -0.002** -0.002***  -0.001
Secondary education  0.273*** 0.240***  0.359***
>Secondary education  0.505*** 0.479***  0.516***
Female 0.052*** 0.021  0.064***
Married 0.063*** 0.074***  0.161***
Foreign born  -0.125*** -0.104***  -0.247***
Self employed  0.236*** 0.197***  0.172***
Unemployed -0.059 -0.068*  -0.089
Cancer -0.146*** -0.158***  0.089*
Heart problems  -0.194*** -0.183***  -0.088**
Diabetes -0.041 -0.048*  -0.081**
High blood pressure  0.155*** 0.155***  0.018
Chronic lung disease  -0.142*** -0.167***  -0.095*
Number of chronic symptoms  -0.376*** -0.390***  0.004
Smoke 0.002 -0.013  0.071***
Drink 0.138*** 0.103***  0.086***
Exercise 0.497*** 0.497***  0.053**
Austria 0.231*** 0.336***  0.513***
Belgium 0.626*** 0.600***  1.790***
Denmark 0.483*** 0.741***  0.529***
France 0.404*** 0.329***  2.254***
Greece 0.477*** 0.400***  -0.396***
Italy 0.184*** 0.238***  -0.409***
Spain 0.297*** 0.280***  0.058
Sweden 0.599*** 1.012***  -0.687***
Switzerland 0.786*** 0.622***  0.697***
 
  28